Nokia
|
Chinese
supplier
|
|
Coercive
pressure
|
Customers
demand sustainable products. Fear for lack of customers if details of manufacture
become public knowledge
|
Chinese
governmental laws; pressure from Nokia and possibly other customers. Possibly
demands from their HQ in Germany, since they are a German company
|
Mimicry
|
Mimicking Scandinavian
and/or competing companies (Apple, Samsung)
|
Mimicking
other Chinese companies in terms of payment, working overtime, and housing.
Manager mentions that Nokia will not find a different situation if they would
look at other companies/competitors
|
Normative pressure
|
‘Expert’ on
sustainability and ethics, Scandinavian based company
|
European/American
manager, they are a German company
|
The table shows how both Nokia and the supplier of Nokia
strive for legitimacy. Nokia is trying to persuade their supplier by using
coercive pressure. But also by sending consultants to inspect their company,
which can be divided to normative pressure; Nokia is trying to persuade them of
changing their norms to a more European model. The documentary shows that the
supplier does not immediately change, this is of course a process that takes
time, but eventually they make small concessions. The next paragraph will
discuss if the approach of Nokia is an effective way of diffusing their
sustainability criteria.
Is Nokia effective in their approach?
I would argue that Nokia’s approach is a safe but slow way,
possibly the fastest, of diffusing their sustainability criteria. You can
summarize Nokia’s approach with the concluding meeting between the staff of
Nokia and the managers of the Chinese supplier. Before the start of the
meeting, the faces of the managers of the supplier show anxiety. In the last
weeks (?) they’ve noticed Nokia is not happy with many things in and around their
factory. They fear that they could lose their main customer. But Nokia handles
it well, they mention things that are going well, and things they would like to
have fixed (working overtime, having a choice between living on the site or
elsewhere). Nokia even elaborates more things that they think are going well,
rather than all the problems. The manager’s reply is that he is happy that they
have found some good things as well. As cooperating companies, you do not want
to obstruct your relation with one-another. Pressuring too hard might cause too
much friction, which could stall improvement or even worsen the situation. This
is why Nokia plays it safe; they are happy with any improvement and know that
the process of improving the situation at the supplier’s factory will take
time. Nokia also knows that if their relation turns bad, they might lose their
supplier. Searching for a different one will take time and money, and moreover,
they would have to go through the same process of diffusing sustainability
again, because other companies are likely to have a situation that is very
alike to the initial situation of the supplier. Therefor I think Nokia’s
approach is an effective way of diffusing their sustainability criteria.
Other coordination
Governance
Convincing
the Chinese government to sharpen their laws and monitoring of those laws is an
option for Nokia. This will probably speed up the process of improving
sustainability of many factories in China, but it is not likely the Chinese
government will change the laws because of Nokia alone.
Self-organization
If the
supplier has own incentives of improving their sustainability other than
through governance, they could improve through self-organization. Examples for
incentives are a lack of employees because they do not want to work for the
supplier any longer because of the working situation. This is example is also
not likely, since these employees would need an alternative place to work. If
the situation is the same at other factories, they will not have this
alternative.
The paragraph you use as an introduction is actually theory right? It seems like you are explaining the three kinds of transmission to prove that both Nokia and the supplier company are becoming similar. However, I do not think this is the case here. An introduction of what the documentary was about or the things that caught your attention in the documentary would be a better way to start this blog than theory. I think that you added the theory part to make it easier for the reader to understand your table?
BeantwoordenVerwijderenI think the coercive pressure from the Chinese government on the Chinese supplier is there, but not that strict which is why the company does not abide to many regulations. The same stands for the pressure from Nokia and possibly other consumers. The table gives a good overview and I like how you use the theory in this case. However, you do explain some legitimacies like the coercive pressure and the normative pressure. About the mimicry aspect, you could say that the Chinese supplier tries to strive for legitimacy by trying to show the auditors that other suppliers are even worse. As mimicry is in your table, it would be good to add a few words about that in the text as well.
I partly agree with your arguments that Nokia is effective in their approach. They do highlight the good parts apart from the bad parts, but I think that Nokia could have been more strict. There are many more suppliers in China and the focus should have been more on the improvements. The focus should have been more on the minimum wages, which we heard them complaining throughout the video, but at the final meeting it seemed like a minor detail. I agree with you that changes a whole process is difficult, and changes are often difficult to successfully implement. However, I think that Nokia should increase their coercive pressure and really show that they do not agree with some of the working ethics at the factory.
The other 2 coordination mechanisms you have mentioned are both difficult to obtain in my opinion. It is easier said than done to convince the Chinese government to sharpen their laws. I do not think that Nokia, as one single company, has the power influence to make this change happen. (which you have identified as well). I agree that this could speed up the process, but this mechanism is difficult to realize in real life.
I also think that for the Chinese supplier the incentive to improve their production chains and working conditions for workers does not have a high priority. The supplier already feels “superior” and think that they are better than the other factories in China. For example, even after the auditors explained that on a large scale, they would still have a big proportion of profit if they would comply with minimum wages, they were hesitant to implement this change. This shows the unwillingness for change and shows that changes will be only be implemented if demanded by pressures from higher up.